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Nous étudions l'impact de l'incertitude par rapport aux données, la
spécification du modèle ainsi que les paramètres sur des règles de décisions de
politique monétaire. Notre analyse est fondée sur le modèle de Taylor et les règles
de politique monétaire qui en découlent. Nous utilisons une banque de données qui
contient l'historique des données macro-économique telles qu'elles ont été publiées
et révisées à travers le temps. Ainsi notre étude est en temps réel et respecte la
chronologie des données que les protagonistes de la politique avaient à leur
disposition à travers le temps. Nous étudions différents mécanismes de calibrage
et d'apprentisage par moyen d'estimation.
We examine the prevalence of data, specification, and parameter
uncertainty in the formation of simple rules which mimic monetary policy-making
decisions. Our approach is to build real-time datasets, simulate a real-time policy-
setting environment, and provide a set of prescriptions and diagnoses which are
useful not only within the context on monetary policy rules, but also within the
context of the application of real-time data to macroeconomics in general. Some
of our findings can be summarized as follows. First, while our version of
"calibration" is better than naive estimation, both are dominated by an approach
to rule formation based on adaptive least squares learning using real-time data.
Second, it appears that rules based on seasonally unadjusted data are more
reliable than when seasonally adjusted data are used. Finally, it does not pay to
use data which are too preliminary. Indeed, it appears that it would be in the best
interest of policymakers to wait until some of the data uncertainty associated with
preliminary data has been removed by the revision process. Although some rules
require more patience than others, a prescription based on our best-performing
rule points to a waiting period of 9 months for monthly data, which in turn leads
to around a 50% increase in precision.
Mots Clés : Révision des données, crédibilité des politiques monétaires,
attentes rationelles et adaptives, données en temps réel
Keywords : Data revision process, monetary authority credibility, predictive
ability, adaptive and rational expectations, real-time data
JEL : C82, C53, C22
1 Introduction
In academic circles, model and data uncertainty are rarely accounted for
when monetary policy decision-making is discussed. By model uncer-
tainty, we mean that the specication and/or parameters of a model are
no longer assumed to be xed and known. While ignoring this type of
uncertainty often leads to tractable models which are easily analyzed, it
may also paint a picture of the world which is oversimplied. By data
uncertainty, we mean that rst released data are often noisy in the sense
that incomplete and/or erroneous initial information has been used in
their construction. Indeed, it may take many years of revisions before
data are considered nal. Furthermore, actual policy decisions are made
in a real-time setting using preliminary and/or partially revised data.
Thus, questions relating not only to which variables should be used, but
also to which data releases should be used, make the process of policy-
making much more complex than is typically assumed in abstract models
of monetary policy. In this paper we consider the above issues by exam-
ining monetary policy-rules using adaptive and recursive learning based
on least squares, and using data which are available in real-time.
Uncertainty in policy models is an issue which has recently received
some attention in the literature, both from the perspective of model mis-
specication and from the perspective of learning. Examples of papers in
this area include Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (1997), Chung (1990),
Granger and Deutsch (1992), Hansen and Sargent (1998), Marcet and
Nicolini (1997), and Sargent (1998). Related papers in the area of learn-
ing are: Bray (1982), Bray and Kreps (1987), Kuan and White (1994),
Marcet and Sargent (1989a,b), and Woodford (1990), while a review of
the learning literature is in Marimon (1997). Anderson et al. (1997)
and Hansen and Sargent (1998) consider discrete and continuous time
optimal policy control models where decision makers assume that their
models are misspecied, and adopt robust strategies which are meant
to hedge against certain types of model misspecication. In particular,
closed form policy rules are formulated which are a function of a ro-
bustness parameter. The robustness parameter, in turn, resembles com-
monly used measures of risk aversion. In this approach, decision-makers
no longer take for granted that their model is: (1) true, in the sense that
their model coincides with the underlying data generating process, (2)
known by the decision-maker, and (3) xed or time invariant. In the
same spirit as Anderson et al. (1997), although less formally, Granger
and Deutsch (1992) examine the evaluation of policy decisions which
arise when a particular economic variable is targeted. They propose nu-
merous tests based on the comparison of actual target variable outcomes
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with forecast values arising from the implementation of competing policy
models.
Despite the recent interest in model uncertainty, it should be stressed
that the bulk of the literature on monetary policy rules assumes that
models are known and correctly specied. Within this context, rational
expectations assumptions play a central role, and have led to numer-
ous powerful policy prescriptions. The seminal papers by Phelps (1967),
Friedman (1968) and Lucas (1972) laid much of the groundwork for these
new results. Implications of this work were profound regarding the nat-
ural rate theory and the temporary character of trade-os between ina-
tion and unemployment, for example. The policy implications were far
reaching in many other dimensions as well. For example, the Lucas cri-
tique suggested that the common practice of tting econometric models,
and simulating policy outcomes was in general incorrect. Despite the
Lucas critique, however, the old approach of estimating new economet-
ric models, and hence of formulating new policy prescriptions each time
new data became available remained much in use. As Sargent (1998a)
points out, this quandry can in many ways be equated with the distinc-
tion between policymaking under adaptive versus rational expectations.
Sargent also stresses that early ndings concerning the sub-optimality of
adaptive expectations assumptions were based on the analysis of models
which were assumed to be correctly specied (i.e. without model un-
certainty). For example, when all models are viewed as approximations
Sargent shows that simple "adaptive" forecasting techniques based on
rolling regressions, where parameters are updated at each point in time,
actually yield forecasts which are not inferior to those based on "opti-
mal" rational expectations theories. This result is perhaps surprising,
given that the rolling regression approach is certainly not optimal in a
standard utility optimizing representative agent framework.
In this paper we examine model and data uncertainty within the con-
text of monetary policy rules. In particular, we focus on monetary policy
rules in which a short-term interest rate (the federal funds rate) is used
as the policy instrument, and the monetary authority targets ination
and output. The class of rules which we consider are commonly refered
to as Taylor's rules (see Taylor (1979, 1993a)), and are motivated by
the apparent existence of tradeos between ination and output vari-
ability. Versions of these rules have been incorporated in and/or arise in
a variety of dierent macroeconomic models. For example, Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997, 1998) develop a rational expectations model with
intertemporally optimizating agents in which various interest rate target-
ing rules arise as optimal responses of the monetary authority. This series
of papers is not only important because monetary policy rules are shown
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to arise naturally when expected utility in a representative household is
maximized, but also because the model allows for the computation of
welfare measures for representative households under dierent monetary
policy rule implementations. Based on their theoretical model, as well
as on a thorough empirical evaluation, Rotemberg and Woodford (1998)
nd that low and stable ination together with stable interest rates can
be acheived when Taylor's rules of the type which we examine are aug-
mented by including lagged federal funds rates. Many other extensions
and variations of Taylor's rule have been proposed in recent years. For
example, policy rules that focus on exchange rates or the money supply
are alternatives to rules which focus on interest rates. Indeed, the re-
cent literature on policy rules is large. A partial list of relevant papers
includes: Ball (1997), Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993), Cukierman
(1995), Estrella and Mishkin (1998), Frankel and Chinn (1995), Fuhrer
(1997), Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Hansen (1996), Henderson and McK-
ibbin (1993), King and Wolman (1996), Levin, Wieland and Williams
(1998), Matheny (1996), McCallum (1993,1997), and Taylor (1993b).
We take our policy rules as given, and do not rationalize them with
respect to any particular macroeconomic model. Thus, we do not at-
tempt to oer new insights into the usefulness of policy rules per se (see
e.g. Taylor (1993a,b), Sargent (1998a)). Moreover, unlike Hansen and
Sargent (1998), we do not examine the deeper issue of the eect of model
uncertainty on the design of policy rules, as we do not concern ourselves
with the specication of a theoretical model. Rather, our approach is to
emphasize two related but dierent issues, namely (i) model uncertainty
viewed through the lens of parameter uncertainty and model specica-
tion, and (ii) the availability and timing of data with which to examine
and implement rules.
With regard to the former issue, it should perhaps be noted that
most papers which empirically examine policy rules abstain from pa-
rameter estimation and instead resort to calibration. As Sargent (1998b)
points out, this approach implicitly assumes that the model from which
the policy rule is derived is an approximation. Indeed, Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998), for example, are clearly aware of this issue, as they em-
pirically examine not only optimal policy rules which derive from their
theoretical model (when appropriately calibrated), but also a variety
of other related rules which are essentially alternative versions of Tay-
lor's rule. This approach is consistent with the argument that since the
models under investigation are approximations, the policy rules are also
approximations. Furthermore, the "best" approximation might change
as new information becomes available, not only in the sense of shifting
parameters but also in the sense of changing specications. Along these
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lines, one is left wondering what eects parameter estimation (or more
generally parameter uncertainty) and model specication, have on the
empirical evaluation of policy rules. We attempt to quantify these eects
by jointly assessing their impact on the evaluation of policy rules when
parameters are xed (or calibrated), when parameters are estimated at
a given point in time, when parameters are re-estimated as new infor-
mation becomes available (a form of adaptive learning), and when the
variables to include in the policy rule are chosen anew at each point in
time (changing model specication).
With regard to the latter issue, the importance of the timing and
availability of the data which are used in the emprical evaluation of pol-
icy rules is crucial. In order to address this important issue, we use
real-time datasets to replicate the information available to policy mak-
ers at any given point in time in the day-to-day process of policy setting.
In this sense, we simulate a real-time policy setting environment. Our
real-time data collection strategy ensures that "future information" due
to the use of information which is temporally antecedent to the date
under consideration is not (accidentally) incorporated into the dataset
at the wrong point in time. This is particularly important for season-
ally adjusted data, for example, as two sided lters are generally used in
the construction of such data, and the reestimation of the lters after
date t, using data from t + 1 and t + 2, say, results in a revised sea-
sonally adjusted gure for t which actually contains information which
was available beyond period t. Before discussing the relative merits of
using real-time datasets, however, it is worth pointing out that within
the context of timing (or availability), economic data can easily be clas-
sied into three types: (1) Preliminary Data: These types of data
consist of the rst reported datum for each variable at each point in
time. (2) Partially Revised or Real-T ime Data: These types of data
are much more dicult to collect than preliminary data, as they are
made up of a full vector of observations at each point in time for each
variable. (3) Fully Revised or Final Data: Final data are data which
have been successively revised, and for which no further revisions will
be made. This is the type of data that academics often have in mind
when conducting economic time series studies, perhaps simply because
it is data which is not subject to revision, and it is felt that if one could
adequately forecast a fully revised gure, then there would be no need
for further modeling. It is quite possible, however, that true final data
will never be available for many economic series.
1
Interestingly, most
1
This is because benchmark and denitional changes are ongoing and may continue
into the indenite future, for example. Moreover, seasonal adjustment lters involve
two-sided lters which in principle have innite leads and lags.
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datasets which are constructed by applied economists clearly consist of
a mixture of preliminary data, partially revised data, and nal revised
data, but are clearly not real-time. This is an issue which has not been
completely overlooked in the literature. For example, Orphanides (1997)
recognizes the importance of real-time data when evaluating policy rules,
and examines monetary policy rules using quarterly real-time data for
the period 1987-1992. Our approach diers from Orphanides' in a num-
ber of respects. In particular, we use monthly data over a period of
more than 20 years, examine parameter as well as model specication
uncertainty, and consider the eects of using seasonally adjusted versus
unadjusted data. In related work, Maravall and Pierce (1983, 1986),
Pierce (1981), Sargent (1989), Trivellato and Rettore (1986) and Swan-
son, Ghysels and Callan (1997), examine revision process errors, while
Diebold and Rudebusch (1991), Fair and Shiller (1990) and Swanson
and White (1995,1997) point out that the comparison of econometric
forecasts based on data from CITIBASE, for example, with forecasts
made in real-time by professional forecasters (e.g. see Croushore (1993))
is invalid, strictly speaking, because real-time data are not used in the
estimation of the econometric models.
There are a multitude of dimensions pertaining to the use of real-time
data in policy rules. First, with real-time data we can mimic the eects
of parameter uncertainty in actual policy setting, since we can estimate
policy rules with data which were truly available at any given point in
time. This is particularly important with seasonally adjusted data, as
such data are subject to revisions based on two-sided lters. To appraise
the impact of data uncertainty we examine policy rules using: (1) sea-
sonally adjusted and unadjusted real-time data, (2) dierent vintages of
data (i.e. rst releases and various revisions) and (3) ex-post data (i.e.
the latest currently available data, regardless of the vintage). Hence, our
analysis is based on a very broad interpretation of data uncertainty.
Our ndings can broadly be summarized as a set of prescriptions
and diagnoses which are useful not only within the context of monetary
policy rules, but also within the context of the application of real-time
data to macroeconomics in general. A partial list of our prescriptions
and diagnoses are as follows. Vintage matters in policy decision mak-
ing. For example, it is clear that using only "nal" data does not yield
optimal decision rules. Thus, prediction precision and hence monetary
authority credibility is aected by the vintage (or release) of data used.
Adaptive least squares learning yields improved results. In particular,
while "calibration" is better than naive estimation, both are dominated
by an approach to policy rule formation based on adaptive least squares
learning. Dynamic information sets are useful. Put another way, policy
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rules based on distributed lag polynomials of target variables outperform
simpler rules. In addition, the correct application of real-time informa-
tion leads to policy rule precision which is comparable to that achieved
by the use of ex-post data. Thus, the use of the standard (ex-post)
sorts of datasets routinely applied in empirical economics not only inval-
idates any claim that later empirical ndings are representative of the
real-time ow of events in the economy, but also yields no noteable per-
formance enhancement. Seasonally unadjusted data are better. This may
be surprising as it is often argued that seasonal adjustment lters extract
the "relevant" component of the data (see e.g. Ghysels (1994)). How-
ever, even cursory examination of our policy simulation results reveals
that rules based on seasonally unadjusted data are more reliable than
when seasonally adjusted data are used. Moreover, unadjusted data are
directly available and avoid ltering problems which are exagerated in
real-time datasets. Our last main nding is the following. Patience pays
o. In particular, it does not pay to use data which are too preliminary.
Indeed, it appears that it would be in the best interest of policymakers to
wait until some of the data uncertainty associated with preliminary data
has been removed by the revision process. Although some rules require
more patience than others, a prescription based on our best-performing
rule points to a waiting period of 9 months for monthly data, which in
turn leads to around a 50% increase in precision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we broadly
discuss monetary policy rules. Section 3 contains details of the datasets
which we have constructed. Empirical considerations are discussed in
Section 4, while our ndings are presented in Section 5. Conclusions are
gathered in the nal section.
2 A Brief Background of Monetary Policy
Rules
John Taylor, in his seminal 1979 paper, introduces nominal rigidities into
a rational expectations framework, and derives a model of the macroe-
conomy in which monetary policy irrelevance does not hold. Optimal
monetary policy in this setting exploits a second-order Phillips curve
(i.e. a long-run trade-o between ination and output volatility), im-
plying that business cycle uctuations can be reduced by increasing the
variability of ination through accommodating monetary policies. In ad-
dition, the most important policy instrument in the U.S. since the 1960's
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has arguably been the Federal Funds rate.
2
Thus, it is not surprising
that recent research in optimal monetary policy has focused primarily
on the use of short-term interest rates as policy instruments. For exam-
ple, Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993) report on a series of policy rule
simulations, in which short-term interest rates are adjusted in response
to deviations (from predetermined targets) in (a) the exchange rate, (b)
the money supply, (c) nominal output, and (d) a combination of ina-
tion (or the price level) and real output. Their ndings suggest that
rules which target ination and output are the most successful in terms
of reducing and stabilizing output and price variability. Taylor (1993a)
draws on this nding and suggests a simple interest rate policy rule:
R
t
= 1 + 1:5
t
+ 0:5y
t
; (1)
where, R
t
is the federal funds rate, 
t
is the rate of ination, and y
t
is
the output gap (i.e. the percentage deviation of output from its long-run
trend).
3
With this rule, the monetary authority raises the Federal Funds
rate if either ination rises above a target rate (which is assumed to be
2) or if real output rises above its long-term trend, with equal weights
applied in either case. Using quarterly data, Taylor demonstrates that
this rule succesfully mimics U.S. monetary policy for the period 1987
to 1992. Since our analysis is based on monthly data we replicate his
graphical evidence (see Figure 1) using real-time industrial production
and the Consumer Price Index series. Even though Taylor's original
analysis is not based on real-time data and uses quarterly data, our
ndings based on various versions of Taylor's rule generally agree with
his observations.
In addition to Taylor's (1993a,b) evidence, other recent research
which further explores rational expectations models with sticky prices
suggests that simple policy rules succesfully mimic the dynamic proper-
ties of the economy (e.g. Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Fuhrer (1997) and
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,1998)). Fuhrer estimates the "optimal
policy frontier" which dictates the optimal trade-o between deviations
of ination around a target and output around its potential. This trade-
o rises rapidily when the standard deviation of either ination or output
falls below 2%, which suggests that a balanced policy is preferable. Also,
2
See Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Meulendyke
(1990)) for related discussion and for a detailed account of recent U.S. monetary
policy operations.
3
It should be stressed that Taylor does not advocate this particular rule, and
notes that "... simple, algebraic formulations of such rules cannot and should not
be mechanically followed by policymakers" (Taylor (1993a, pp. 213)). However, we
view (1) as his "best" specication.
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he shows that Taylor's (1979) model lies close to this optimal frontier.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) suggest an alternate optimal policy,
one that responds positively to both the lagged funds rate itself, with
a parameter larger than one, and ination. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998, pp. 52) conclude that: "Probably our most important conclu-
sion is that a simple interest-rate feedback rule of the kind proposed by
Taylor (1993) can achieve outcomes nearly as good as are achievable in
principle by any policy, assuming that the commitment of the monetary
authority to the rule can be made suciently credible"
A novel view of the history of U.S. monetary policy is proposed by
Sargent (1998), in which a new form of adaptive expectations is intro-
duced. The methodology is applied to the hypothesized "regime shift"
that followed Paul Volker's election as chairman the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve. Sargent suggests that the shift in policy asso-
ciated with Volcker's chairmanship may not have come from a sudden
adherence to a rational expectations philosophy but rather gradually by
a learning process that was adaptive, driven by the accumulation of in-
formation on the success and/or failure of past policies. In particular,
Sargent (1998, pp. 141) notes that: "The regime shifts occur, not from
a change in the government's econometric or policy-making procedures,
but from a change in the beliefs created by its econometric procedure"
Our approach is to combine Taylor's rule with Sargent's notion of
adaptive learning. One dimension of our approach is that we use re-
cursive estimation with xed and increasing windows of data. These
methods comprise a menu of alternative means by which we implement
adaptive expectations, and thus emulate the real-time process of policy-
making. In this sense, we generalize Taylor's (1993a) rule to address
criticisms of the operationality of the rule. The criticisms which we are
refering to have been raised, for example, by McCallum (1993) and Or-
phanides (1997). In particular, they note that versions of Taylor's rule
which have been examined in the literature (i) are not operational due
to their reliance on contemporaneous data, and (ii) are not comparable
to actual policy setting scenarios because ex-post data which are not
real-time are used to t the rules.
4
One feature of our approach is that
4
As an example of what is meant by "real-time", consider the case of industrial
production (IP). When constructing a real-time dataset for IP, then for January
1990, say, a complete sequence of data going back to the beginning of the sample, say
January 1959, must be collected. Furthermore, the data must be collected as if one
were in January 1990, so that the nal datum collected is actually the preliminary
gure for December of 1989 (if this preliminary gure is available yet), while the
datum for January 1959 has been revised many times for a variety of reasons (e.g.
updates, denitional changes, and benchmark revisions). The key here is that no
information which only became available after January 1990 is incorporated in any of
8
by making use of real-time data we are able to address issues relating
to response times of policymakers to new information. For example, it
is of interest to assess whether policy rules based on rst available data
better emulate actaul economic uctuations than policy rules based on
later releases of data for some given calendar period. In addition, we
address the choice between the use of seasonally adjusted or unadjusted
data. This is a relevant issue because the revision processes of these two
varieties of data are generally very dierent (see above discussion).
5
3 Data
In this section we present the details of our real-time datasets. The
rst subsection is devoted to a description of the data. In the second
subsection we discuss our approach to constructing real-time measures
of ination and the output gap.
3.1 Real-Time Datasets
In the sequel we use four monthly U.S. time series. Two of the variables
(the target and eective federal funds rates) are not subject to revision.
The other two variables (industrial production and the consumer price
index) are subject to revision, and real-time datasets for each of them
(both seasonally unadjusted and adjusted) have been constructed. In
particular, industrial production (IP) data for the period 1950:04 to
1998:03 have been gathered, while consumer price index (CPI) data for
the period 1978:01 to 1998:03 have been gathered. It is worth noting
that the data matrix for IP contains more than 170,000 nontrivial entries
while the data matrix for the CPI contains more than 29,000 nontrivial
entries. As discussed above, the large number of observations in our
real-time datasets is due to the nature of the data collection - at each
point in time an entirely new sequence of data is collected, going back to
the beginning of the sample period. In order to further illustrate these
the IP gures in the real-time vector of observations corresponding to a release date
of January 1990. Then, a whole new sequence of data beginning in January 1959 and
ending with data available in February 1990 is collected. This procedure is continued
for each observational period in the sample, so that a matrix of observations comprises
our real-time time dataset.
5
There have been a number of papers which examine the relative merits of using
seasonally adjusted versus unadjusted data within the context of monetary policy.
Much of this research has focussed on the impact of data uncertainty on monetary
policy decisions (see e.g. Maravall and Pierce (1983,1986)), and on the impact of
lter design on policy implementation (see e.g. Ghysels (1987)). In this paper we do
not focus on lter design, but rather we revisit data uncertainty.
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features of our data, we reproduce the matrix structure of a generic real-
time dataset in Table 1. The entries in the table are denoted X
t
( );
where the subscript t refers to the release date of the data pertaining
to period  , the date which is in parentheses. Therefore, the diagonal
elements in the matrix correspond to the rst released or preliminary
data. For example, the rst entry in Table 1 shows the May 1950 release
of the April IP or CPI gure. Keeping  xed the rst row in the table
shows the series of revisions from t = May 1950 up until the end of our
dataset March 1998.
Both IP and CPI data are released on or around the 15th of each
month, and a typical months' release of data for these variables is com-
prised of a rst, or preliminary release for the previous month, and 1
to 5 months of revisions to data previously released. In addition, more
comprehensive benchmark and base year revisions occur from time to
time for each of these variables. Turning rst to the IP data, the fol-
lowing details are worth noting. Seasonally adjusted and unadjusted IP
gures are compiled by the Federal Reserve Board. The primary source
for seasonally adjusted IP data is the Federal Reserve Bulletin. For un-
adjusted IP (before October 1995) the main source is the Bureau of
Economic Analysis' publication Survey of Current Business. Additional
data for these series were obtained from Federal Reserve monthly sta-
tistical releases. Federal Reserve releases for IP are called G.12.3 before
May 1990, and G.17 thereafter. Recent releases, and a partial real-time
dataset from 1972 onwards for seasonally adjusted data, can also be
obtained from the Board of Governor's of the Federal Reserve's web-
site (http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/releases). Also, for three of the major
(benchmark) revisions to IP, the Federal Reserve Board released sepa-
rate publications - (1) Industrial Production 1957-59 Base, (2) Industrial
Production 1971 and (3) 1976 Revision.
Aside from typical monthly revisions to recently released data, there
have various major updates to IP. Numerous updates are "benchmark"
updates for which at least 10 years of data are revised. In the January
1997 benchmark update, it was announced that the primary feature of
the benchmark update was to reformulate indexes based on weights that
are updated annually rather than every ve years, as had been previ-
ously done. In general, updates involve updating seasonal adjustment
weights (for seasonally adjusted data) and incorporating more complete
information on important individual series, while benchmark updates
additionally revise series denitions. Another type of update is the base
year change. Examples of dates for updates of these types are: July
1971, July 1985, March 1990 and January 1997. Each of these base year
updates coincides with a benchmark update, and in fact there are only
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four recent benchmark updates which do not correspond to base year
updates (October 1967, July 1976, January 1994, and January 1998).
Recent updates which are not benchmark updates occured during June
1964, August 1965, October 1966, June 1972, June 1973, August 1977,
July 1979, August 1980, August 1981, August 1986, September 1987,
April 1993 and November 1994, for example. For IP, there are 3 missing
entries due to two major revisions, they are November and December
1953 and March 1985. We replaced each missing observation with the
rst available data for that period (which in each case is the second
release).
Our real-time dataset for seasonally adjusted CPI was constructed
from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis publications. The main source of
this data is National Economic Trends. However, recent releases of the
CPI can be obtained from http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/dataindx.html.
In general, benchmark revisions to the CPI occur every 12 months, at
which time revisions to the data for the preceding 12 months are re-
ported. There is one base year revision - January 1988 (see National
Economic Trends, pp. iii - August 1988 for details.)
For unadjusted CPI data, the series is compiled by the Department
of Labor. The sources for the data are the Survey of Current Busi-
ness, and the Department of Labor Publications entitled Monthly Labor
Review and Consumer Price Index Detailed Report. There have been 3
recent base year updates in January of 1971, 1988, and 1995. These base
year updates coincide with benchmark updates. Current releases, and
detailed information regarding this series are available at the Bureau of
Labor Statistics' CPI website (http://stats.bls.gov/cpifact8.htm).
The remaining variables, the target federal funds rate and the ef-
fective federal funds rate (1979:10 to 1998:04), are available from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve, respectively. The target federal funds rate is the
Board of Governors' announced target for the overnight rate on interbank
loans - which is revealed following each Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) meeting. Generally FOMC meetings are held 8 times a year,
except in special circumstances. We constructed a monthly dataset for
this series which corresponds to the timing of our IP and CPI datasets.
To do this, we assign the appropriate federal funds rates to each month,
given the release dates of the IP and CPI data, which are often the 15th
of each month, and almost always between the 14th and 17th. There-
fore, we align each announced change in the target federal funds rate
with the latest months' release of IP and CPI data that was available
to the Board of Governors at the time of their decision. The notation
that we use reects these timing issues. If we denote some particular
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target federal funds rate as r
t
, the preliminary data release for this ob-
servation is denoted X
t 1
( ); where  = (t   2), i.e. at the time of the
Board's decision, t, the most recent information available - released at
time (t  1) - pertains to the calendar date (t  2). In this way, it is the
availability of information that denes our "calendar time". The eec-
tive federal funds rate is the actual overnight rate on interbank loans.
Again, we construct a monthly dataset for this series that corresponds
to our real-time datasets. In this case, for each month we calculate the
average of the eective federal funds rate for the 4 weeks following the
release date of IP and CPI data.
3.2 Real-Time Ination and Output Gap Measures
In order to construct operational real-time measures of ination and of
the output gap, we begin by assuming that our data are "nal" after 23
revisions, so that our variables are assumed not to change appreciably
beyond the 24th release. In our analysis we consider rst and twelveth
dierences of CPI. In particular, we form:

t
(t  1) = 1200(log(CPI
t
(   1))  log(CPI
t
(   2)))) or

t
(t  1) = 100(log(CPI
t
(   1))  log(CPI
t
(   13)))),
where  = t; t   1; t   2; :::. We consider annualized monthly ination
because this corresponds to the standard data transformation used in
many empirical studies. On the other hand, twelveth dierenced CPI
data are used in order to facillitate a comparison of real-time time policy
simulation outcomes based on either seasonally adjusted or seasonally
unadjusted data. As  varies, we essentially construct two new ination
series for each release of CPI data. Our output gap variable is the
deviation of industrial production from its loglinear trend. Industrial
production trend regressions are estimated using samples of 6-12 years
of data, and as our empirical results were found to be qualitatively similar
in all cases, we use 9 years of data for output gap calculations hereafter.
In addition, we use real-time data in all trend regressions, and include
seasonal dummy variables when constructing gap estimates based on
seasonally unadjusted data. Thus, we construct the output gap as:
y
t
(t  1) = 100(log(IP
t
(   1))  log(
c
IP
t
(   1))),
where
c
IP
t
(   1) is the forecast of trend output based on information
available at time t  1, and  = t; t  1; t  2; :::.
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4 Real-Time Policy Strategies
Along the lines discussed in section 2, we examine various real-time ver-
sions of Taylor's rule. These rules can be summarized as follows, where
m denotes the vintage of data used, m is a xed integer between 2 and
25, and t indexes the horizon over which the policy rule is implemented:
Rule 1: R
t
= 1 + 1:5
t 1
(t m) + 0:5y
t 1
(t m);
Rule 2: R
t
= a^
0
+
^
b
1

t 1
(t m) + c^
1
y
t 1
(t m);
Rule 3: R
t
= a^
0
+
P
p
1
j=0
^
b
j

t 1
(t  j  m) +
P
p
2
j=0
c^
j
y
t 1
(t  j  m);
Rule 4: R
t
= a^
0
+
P
p
1
(t 1)
j=0
^
b
j

t 1
(t j m)+
P
p
2
(t 1)
j=0
c^
j
y
t 1
(t j m);
Rule 5: R
t
= a^
0
+
P
p
1
j=1
P
p
2
k=j 1
^
b
jk

t j
(t k m)+
P
p
3
j=1
P
p
4
k=j 1
c^
jk
y
t j
(t  k  m):
In Rules 1-5, R
t
is a short-term interest rate instrument (in our
case either the eective or target Federal Funds rate), 
t
is the rate
of ination, and y
t
is the output gap. Notice that for Rules 1-2, only one
vintage of data is used, and this data is always released at time t 1 and
is thus available at time t. As the vintage, m, varies between 2 and 25,
twenty four dierent versions of these rules exist, leading to twenty-four
real-time policy simulations for each rule. Rules 3 and 4 are the same
as Rules 1 and 2, except that a sequence of dierent vintages of the
target variables which are all released at time t  1 are incorporated in
the policy rule. Recall that the dierent vintages correspond to updates
of historical data. Rule 5 not only xes a vintage "starting point" (as
do Rules 1 to 4), but also allows previous releases of data for the same
calendar time observation to be used by policy setters. This rule, thus,
allows for every dimension of our real-time datasets to be used in the
construction of policy rules.
Exentions to Rules 2-5 which include lagged values of the short-term
interest rate instrument are given as follows:
Rule 6: R
t
= a^
0
+
^
b
1

t 1
(t m) + c^
1
y
t 1
(t m) +
^
dR
t 1
;
Rule 7: R
t
= a^
0
+
P
p
1
j=0
^
b
j

t 1
(t  j  m) +
P
p
2
j=0
c^
j
y
t 1
(t  j  m) +
^
dR
t 1
;
Rule 8: R
t
= a^
0
+
P
p
1
(t 1)
j=0
^
b
j

t 1
(t  j m) +
P
p
2
(t 1)
j=0
c^
j
y
t 1
(t  j 
m) +
^
dR
t 1
;
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Rule 9: R
t
= a^
0
+
P
p
1
j=1
P
p
2
k=j 1
^
b
jk

t j
(t k m)+
P
p
3
j=1
P
p
4
k=j 1
c^
jk
y
t j
(t  k  m) +
^
dR
t 1
:
The above rules can all be interpreted as adaptations of (1) to a
real-time setting. In Rule 1, the response coecients are xed. Hence,
there is no parameter estimation by the monetary authority. One inter-
pretation of Rule 1 is that it is an optimal solution to some calibrated
macroeconomic model. Notice that for any given simulation (across t),
Rule 1 involves one vintage of data (i.e. m is xed). Thus, by varying m
and comparing simulation results we are able to assess the relevance of
dierent vintages (or releases) of economic data for setting policy. One
aspect of this feature of Rule 1 is that by examining the performance of
this rule across vintages, we can quantify the benets associated with
waiting for more precise updates of the relevant target variables.
As Taylor (1993a) points out, it is not clear whether the response
coecients in Rule 1 are optimal. For this reason, Rules 2 through 9
are based on estimated response coecients. (In the sequel we use OLS
in all of our estimations.) In our analysis, we consider three dierent
coecient estimation schemes. The schemes are based on the amount
of data used in, and the frequency of, response coecient estimation.
In the rst scheme, all parameters are estimated once at the beginning
of each real-time policy simulation, and remain xed thereafter. This
scheme is refered to as the No Window case. In the second scheme
(the Fixed Window case) we use xed rolling 50 and 100 month real-
time data windows to re-estimate response parameters before each new
policy decision is made. The third scheme, our Increasing Window case,
is the same as the Fixed Window case except that we use an increasing
real-time data window to estimate the coecients, beginning with a
window width of 50 months. It should be stressed that these schemes
are practically feasible from a policymaking perspective, as they only
entail decisions made using information available in real-time.
The rst rule which uses estimated coecients is Rule 2 (or Rule 6
with laggedR
t
). This rule has the same policy response structure as Rule
1, but with estimated coecients. By comparing Rule 1 and Rule 2 we
are able to assess the relative merits of using estimated rather than cal-
ibrated response coecients. As Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,1998)
show, however, optimal policy may involve distributed lag polynomials
of target variables and policy instruments. Thus, we also consider vari-
ous Rotemberg and Woodford type rules. First, Rule 3 (or Rule 7 with
lagged R
t
) denes R
t
as a function of p
1
vintages of  and p
2
vintages of
y, where p
1
and p
2
are selected using the Schwarz Information Criterion
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(SIC), and the maximum number of lags is 24.
6
Notice although the use
of the word lags refers to calendar time lags, by xing the release date of
our data at t 1, we ensure that the most up to date revisions of all lags
of our target variables are used. In Rule 3, p
1
and p
2
do not change as
new information becomes available, but rather are based on a real-time
"startup" sample of observations. Rule 4 (or Rule 8 with lagged R
t
) is
the same as Rule 3, except that p
1
and p
2
are selected anew every time a
policy decision is made. A comparison of Rule 3 and 4 thus allows us to
assess the impact of parameter uncertainty (which occurs in Rules 3 and
4) and model specication uncertainty (which occurs only in Rule 4).
Note that the type of model specication uncertainty which we consider
is limited to lag order selection.
7
Moreover, comparing Rule 3 or 4 with
Rule 2 highlights the impact of including distributed lags dynamics in
our policy rules, and comparing any of Rules 2-4 with Rule 1 allows us
to assess the impact of parameter and/or specication uncertainty on
policy rules. In summary, the dierent ways in which the various rules
can be compared allows us to disentangle, at least to some extent, the
dierent eects that parameter, specication and data uncertainty have
on Taylor's rule.
Thus far, we have only discussed policy rules based on data which
are available at time t   1. In particular, Rules 1 through 4 assume
that optimal policy is based on a single release of data. For example,
when the subscript on our target variables is t   1, only data available
in period t   1 are used in policy formation. While these rules clearly
entail real-time policy setting, they may be naiive in one sense. If policy
setters believe that dierent releases of data for the same calendar period
contain dierent information, then they may want to formulate rules
based not only on dierent vintages of data released in t   1, but also
on dierent vintages of data released in t   2, say. For example, if the
rst and second release observation for January of 1990 are formed using
information sets which are nonnested, both variables may be useful to
policy setters. Although this sort of scenario might seem surprising,
Swanson, Ghysels and Callan (1997) nd some evidence that it is indeed
true. In order to allow for this eventuality, we also consider Rule 5 (or
Rule 9 with lagged R
t
), which mixes vintages and releases of data.
6
Recall that when referring to "vintages" of data, we are referring to data available
at some calendar date which have been revised. So that the m
th
vintage of data
available at time t   1 is the revised datum for period t m.
7
For example, although nonlinear rules might be relevant to policy-setters, they
are not investigated.
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5 Empirical Findings
In order to facilitate the comparison of our rules, we report four dier-
ent types of results. In particular, we examine (1) ex-ante mean squared
errors and mean absolute percentage errors, (2) turning point predictibil-
ity, (3) parameter estimates and (4) model specications. Our approach
is to simulate a real-time policy setting environment. To do this we
consider ex-ante policy evaluation periods of 50 and 100 months. In
addition to our two policy evaluation periods, we examine seasonally
adjusted and unadjusted data, output gap measures based on 24
th
vin-
tage data and real-time data and the target and eective federal funds
rate. Thus there are 32 dierent permutations of data which can be used
in the construction of tables associated with (1) - (4) above.
In order to streamline the presentation of our ndings, we omit vari-
ous results that are either uninteresting, or compareable to other ndings
which we do report. First, we report results for a 50 month evaluation
period with the eective federal funds rate and a real-time output gap
measure. Results for the 100 month evaluation period, the target federal
funds rate, and the 24
th
vintage based output gap measure are qualita-
tively similar and are available upon request from the authors. Second,
we report results only for Rules 1-5. Although ex-ante mean square error
results, for example, are always better when lagged values of the policy
instrument are used, our ndings across rules, windows, and vintages
remain qualitatively similar, and hence tabulated results for Rules 6-9
are omitted for the sake of brevity. Third, we omit tabular evidence
based on rst dierenced data. As noted above, rst dierences were
only used to examine seasonally adjusted data. We omit these results
because our ndings based on twelveth dierences are superior to com-
pareable results based on rst dierences. This nding is attributable
to the fact that rst dierenced real-time data are considerably more
noisy than real-time data based on twelveth dierences. This is because
the former type of data involve rst and second vintages while the latter
involve rst and twelveth vintages, and twelveth vintage data are rela-
tively more accurate than second vintage data.
8
Finally, our evidence
based on absolute percentage error loss measures does not dier from
the evidence which we oer based on mean square error loss measures,
and so is omitted for the sake of brevity.
Tables 2 through 8 summarize our main empirical ndings. In order
to get a feel for the data which using in our analysis, and in particular the
importance of the revision process, we begin by providing various sum-
8
This observation has been made previously by Maravall and Pierce (1983) in the
context of the noisiness of preliminary seasonally adjusted data.
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mary statistics which are presented in Table 2a. In this table, we report
on two types of data revisions, called xed and increasing width revi-
sions. The xed revisions are constructed asX
t+i
(t) X
t+i 1
(t); and the
increasing width revisions are X
t+i
(t)  X
t
(t); for i = 1; : : : ; 11; 18; and
24: Table 2a contains three panels, corresponding to adjusted and un-
adjusted industrial production as well as adjusted CPI, for which mean,
variance, skewness and kurtosis gures are reported.
9
Observe that the
mean of xed length revisions is signicantly dierent from zero at a 95
percent level of condence, for numerous vintages of data. This suggests
there is systematic bias in revisions of our variables, and such informa-
tion could in principle be used to increase the accuracy of preliminary
releases. Notice also that based on increasing width revisions, the dier-
ence between "nal" (i.e. i=24) and initial releases of data has mean bias
which is signicantly dierent from zero. This implies that a statistically
signicant correction could be made to all releases of the variables, prior
to their nal release. Finally, the skewness and kurtosis statistics re-
ported in Table 2a suggest that data revisions are characterized by clear
departures from normality. This may be due to the presence of outliers
in the revision process, which implies that real-time policy setting based
on recent releases of data may result in policy decisions which are quite
dierent from those which would have been made, had we known the
"nal" data. Thus, the data revision process may be quite important
for policy setting. A comprehensive analysis of the data revision process
for our real-time datasets which includes plots of revision autocorrela-
tion functions and discussion of the pattern of outliers in the data, for
example, is given in Swanson, Ghysels and Callan (1997). As we use
ination and output gap variables in our subsequent analysis, we also
present basic statistics which are analagous to those given in Table 2a
for  and y (see Table 2b). The results based on Table 2b are largely
similar to those discussed above for the raw data, with the noteable
exception that the incidence of signicant mean revisions given in the
second column of the table is reduced. However, note that the absolute
magnitude of these revisions is actually quite large, suggesting that this
nding may be due to the small sample sizes used in the construction of
the statistics.
The rest of our empirical ndings are presented in Tables 3 through
8. Our ndings with regard to data uncertainty are reported in Tables
3-4 for seasonally adjusted data and Tables 6-7 for seasonally unadjusted
data. Tables 5 (adjusted data) and 8 (unadjusted data) summarize our
9
Table 2 does not contain summary statistics for revisions in seasonally unadjusted
CPI data, as revisions occur infrequently, and primarily in conjunction with base year
benchmark revisions.
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ndings with regard to parameter and model uncertainty. In Tables 3
and 6 we report mean square errors (MSEs) associated with 50 real-time
policy decisions.
10
The rst column of the table gives the vintage of the
data. The calendar date of the data used in all rules is t  1, except for
Rule 5 in which a mixture of calendar dates is used (see above). The
second column in the table reports MSEs for Taylor's Rule (Rule 1). The
next three panels report MSEs for Rules 2-5, where response coecients
and/or rule specications vary, and where the "window" of observations
used by policy setters is xed, increasing, or nonexistent. Tables 4 and 7
are presented in the same way, except that so-called "Confusion Rates"
are reported rather than MSEs. The confusion rate indicates the pro-
portion of times that our policy decision correctly predicts the direction
of change in realized interest rates. Thus, a value of 0.50 corresponds
to a policy rule which captures directional changes in interest rates so
poorly that were we to ip a coin, we could do equally well.
11
Finally,
Tables 5 and 8 report the average and standard deviation of the response
coecients associated with the target variables when Rule 2 is the policy
tool. As in the previous tables, the rst column of these tables reports
the vintage of data used to implement the rule.
Based on the results in Tables 3-8, our ndings can be summarized
as follows:
Vintage matters in policy decision making
This nding is supported by noting that MSE values in Tables 3 and
6 are dependent upon vintage. In Tables 3 and 6, lowest MSE values
are boldfaced for each rule. For instance, in Table 3, Rule 1, the MSE
varies from 1.439 to 4.447 depending on vintage. Morevover, MSEs are
not monotonically increasing as vintage increases. Thus, it is not clear
whether only using "nal" data produces optimal decision rules. In
fact, notice that the lowest MSEs in Tables 3 and 6 are associated with
a Fixed Window of data, and occur for relatively recent vintages. For
example, for Rule 4 with the Fixed Window of data, the lowest MSE
vintage is t   11 for adjusted data and t   10 for unadjusted data. In
addition, notice that for the same rule and the Increasing Window of
10
In the tables, the end of our sample is May, 1996, so that we do not exhaust our
entire dataset, which ends in March, 1998. The reason for this is that we also carried
out ex-post policy simulations (assuming that finalized data were known) in order
to assess the accuracy of our ex-ante results (see below).
11
A case could be made for using the target rather than eective federal funds
rate when simulating confusion rates. Unlike the federal funds rate, the target rate
contains a small number of discrete level shifts which are directly associated with
policy decisions, while the eective rate is a smoothed version of the target rate
which might also be impacted by market forces.
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data, the analogous lowest MSE vintages are t   2 and t   3. Thus,
we have evidence that preliminary data are useful.
12
It is important to
note that the "MSE-best" vintage varies across rules. This is expected,
given that our rules exploit the real-time information set dierently. For
example, it should be expected that the MSE-best vintage for Rule 2 is
higher than the MSE-best vintage for Rule 3. This is indeed the case
for all of our results, and follows because Rule 3 uses all information
from vintage m back, say, while Rule 2 only uses information for a given
vintage.
Adaptive least squares learning yields improved results
Based on both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted data, the lowest MSE
value for Rule 1 is higher than the lowest MSE values (except for Rule
2) when the Fixed and/or Increasing Window of data used (see Tables
3 and 6). This suggests that adaptive policy rule formation is useful. In
particular, in the No Window case, where response coecients are not
updated, MSEs are actually worse than in Rule 1, where no estimation
is done whatsoever. Thus, one might conclude based on this nding that
"calibration" (i.e. Rule 1) is better than naiive estimation (i.e. the No
Window case), but worse than adaptive least squares learning (i.e. the
Fixed and Increasing Window cases).
Dynamic information sets are useful
In Tables 3 and 6, when comparing Fixed and Increasing Window
cases, Rules 3 and 4 always "MSE-dominate" Rule 2. In fact, MSE-best
values are reduced by more than 50% in the Fixed Window case when
Rules 2 and 3 are compared. For example, based on unadjusted data
(Table 6), the MSE-best value is 0.534 for Rule 2 and 0.149 for Rule 3,
corresponding to a 72% increase in precision when dynamic information
sets are used.
13
This nding provides evidence that policy rules based
on distributed lag polynomials of target variables may outperform sim-
pler rules (see e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,1998) for further
evidence).
Further evidence that dynamic information sets are useful is given
in Figure 1, where the ex-ante performance of Rules 1-4 for a Fixed
Window of data is graphically illustrated. Even causual observation of
12
This does not mean, that nal data are not useful (except in the case of Rule
2), but rather that the dataset which is "MSE-best" must contain preliminary data,
while it may also contain earlier vintages, including nal data.
13
Note also that the lower MSE in this case is obtained based on the use of an
earlier vintage of data.
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the graphs is sucient to see that Rules 3 and 4 perform better than
Rule 2, and Rules 2-4 perform better than Rule 1. One way to check
whether the graphical evidence provided in Figure 1 is indicitive of our
policy rules being useful in practice (e.g. in the construction of monetary
stance indexes and to establish monetary authority and hence monetary
policy credibility) is to compare the ex-ante performance of the rules
with analogous ex-post performance. By ex-post performance, we mean
that only nal revised data are used in the rules. We implement our
ex-post analysis by using data released in April, 1998. Thus, all data in
our ex-post sample prior to May, 1996 is nal, while newer data has been
revized fewer than 23 times, and hence is not nal, according to our def-
inition. Notice that this type of ex-post analysis is currently the norm
rather than the exception in empirical economics, as data which have
been revised many times are routinely downloaded from CITIBASE, for
example, with no regard to the fact that these data, although represen-
tative of information at time t, say, were actually not available until time
t+ i for i large. Use of datasets of this sort clearly invalidates any claim
that later empirical ndings are representative of the real-time ow of
events in the economy. Nevertheless, a comparison of our ex-ante policy
simulation results with an ex-post policy simulation should yield evi-
dence concerning the usefulness of ex-ante rules. Such evidence is given
in Figure 2, where it is apparent the performance of our ex-ante rules is
essentially as good as an analogous set of ex-post rules where nalized
data are assumed known. This result holds across rules and window
specications. (Results for windows other than the Fixed Window re-
ported on in Figure 2 are available upon request from the authors.) One
reason for the seemingly excellent ex-ante performance of the rules rela-
tive to their ex-post counterparts is that adaptive least squares is used,
so that response coecients are allowed to "adjust" to the type of data
used.
Real-time specication exibility pays o
Rule 4 is the MSE-best rule based on both adjusted and unadjusted
data. Thus, learning is useful in two respects. First, updating response
coecients is better than xing coecients (No Window versus Fixed
and Increasing Window cases). Second, updating the order of the lag
polynomial (model uncertainty) in real-time is better than xing the
specication (Rule 4 versus Rules 1,2,3, and 5).
Revision bias is not as important as the use of real-time data
This nding is based upon a comparison of MSE-best values for Rules
3 and 5 in Tables 3 and 6, where it is clear that Rule 3 is MSE-best.
20
Notice that Rule 3 is closest to Rule 5 as neither incorporates specica-
tion exibility. Thus, Rule 5 directly augments Rule 3 by including the
history of data revision in addition to dierent vintages of data. One
caveat to this nding is that we cannot actually claim that the use of
data is more important than revision bias, rather we can say that given
real-time data, revision history adds nothing in terms of MSE.
Seasonally unadjusted data are better
This may be surprising as it is often argued that seasonal adjustment
lters extract the "relevant" component of the data. If a time series is
viewed as the sum of dierent unobserved components, then it is argued
that the seasonal component is "irrelevant" (see e.g. Ghysels (1994)).
However, what is often not recognized is that seasonal adjustment en-
tails more frequent and larger data revisions than are associated with
unadjusted data (see e.g. Maravall and Pierce (1983)). Since all of our
data are annual dierences, the numerical entries in Tables 3 and 6 are
directly comparable. Even cursory examination of these tables reveals
that the MSE-best unadjusted rules dominate the corresponding MSE-
best adjusted rules. For example, the overall MSE-best value in all of
our tables is 0.124, which obtains when unadjusted data, Rule 4, and
the Fixed Window of data are used. The corresponding entry based on
adjusted data is 0.244, which roughly twice that based on unadjusted
data. A further assessment of the noisiness of preliminary seasonally
adjusted data is obtained when one examines Rule 2, which does not
incorporate lagged polynomial information sets, and which is clearly our
simplest adaptive rule. In the Fixed Window case, a MSE of 1.630 ob-
tains with vintage t  2 when unadjusted data are used. The analogous
gure based on adjusted data is 2.033. Furthermore, the MSE based on
adjusted data does not decrease to 1.630 until vintage t  8, suggesting
that many revisions are necessary in order to smooth out the noisiness
associated with seasonally adjusted data. Thus, using unadjusted data
in policy decisions is MSE-preferable. Moreover, unadjusted data are
directly available.
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Confusion rate ndings based on seasonally adjusted data are confused
Notice that all of our ndings with respect to rule and data window
selection and based on unadjusted data are the same when either MSE
or confusion rate loss is used (see Tables 6 and 7). However, analogous
14
It is also worth noting that the Sims (1974) and Wallis (1974) results on estima-
tion with ltered data do not apply in our context, as interest rates are unltered so
that seasonal adjustment impacts response coecient estimates.
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ndings based on adjusted data and confusion rate loss do not agree with
comparable MSE results (see Tables 3 and 4). In particular, the "con-
fusion rates-best" models (i.e. boldfaced entries) associated with Rule
1 in Table 4 are often lower that those associated with other rules in
Table 4, regardless of which data window is used. This is clearly not the
case with unadjusted data. If these sorts of conicting ndings occured
regardless of data adjustment, one might be led to believe that either
(a) the choice of loss function is crucial or (b) our empirical ndings are
not robust. Indeed, there is much evidence in the economic forecasting
literature that (a) is important (see e.g. Granger (1969) and Leitch and
Tanner (1991)). However, given that our results are robust to evalua-
tion period and output gap specication, it seems more likely that the
problem lies with the use of seasonally adjusted data. For example, it
is known that lters of various types alter the comovements between
economic series (see e.g. Canova (1998)). In summary, our ndings are
consistent with a conjecture that turning point prediction is more sen-
sitive to ltering than is MSE-based prediction. This is sensible if one
believes that unusual (or one-time) events drive turning points, as these
types of events tend to manifest themselves as observational outliers,
which trigger smoothing corrections in standard adjustment programs
(e.g. X-11 and X-12, see Findley, Monsell, Bell, Otto and Cheng (1998)
and Ghysels, Granger and Siklos (1996)).
Response coecients are weakly sensitive to the choice of vintage
Our results with respect to response coecient sensitivity are gathered
in Tables 5 (adjusted data) and 8 (unadjusted data). The layout of these
tables is slightly dierent from the other tables. We take Rule 2 as a
starting point and select the MSE-best vintage for each data window
(called m
opt
). We then form rules as follows:
R
t
= a^
0
+
^
b
1

t m
opt
 j
(t m
opt
) + c^
1
y
t m
opt
 j
(t m
opt
); (2)
where j = 1,..., 24. We use this rule instead of Rule 2 as it allows us
seperate out the impact of parameter uncertainty from that of speci-
cation uncertainty - both are mixed together if one examines parameter
evolution based on Rule 2. In particular, direct use of Rule 2 mixes
parameter and specication uncertainty because the calendar lags used
in the rule depend on the vintage. The mean of the response coecients
given in Tables 5 and 8 varies smoothly, relatively monotonically, and
with little variability across j. Note that output response coecients do
not depend critically on the data window for seasonally unadjusted data
(see Table 8), but are more sensitive to data window when adjusted data
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are used (see Table 5). Ination response coecients, however, appear
to depend critically on the data window used, again with higher vari-
ability across window being associated with seasonally adjusted data.
Thus, while parameter uncertainty is not prevalent, response coecents
depend on the data window used, and hence on rule design.
Patience pays o
It does not pay to use data which are too preliminary. Indeed, it appears
that it would be in the best interest of policymakers to wait until some of
the data uncertainty associated with preliminary data has been removed
by the revision process. Although some rules require more patience
than others, a prescription based on our MSE-best rule (Rule 4, Fixed
Window, Unadjusted data) points to a waiting period of 9 months (see
Table 6). In this particular case, waiting for 9 months results in a 58%
MSE reduction, from 0.298 to 0.124.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined model and data uncertainty within the
context of monetary policy rules. Particular emphasis was placed on
two related but dierent issues, namely (i) model uncertainty viewed
through the lens of parameter and specication uncertainty, and (ii) the
availability and timing of data with which to examine and implement
policy rules. In order to carry out our analysis we built a number of
large real-time datasets and carried out a series of experiments within
the context of a real-time policy setting environment. Our analysis in-
dicated that there are a multitude of dimensions pertaining to the use
of real-time data in an empirical macroeconomic setting. For example,
within the context of simple rules we nd that data vintage (or release)
is important in rule formation, and adaptive least squares learning based
methods are preferable to simpler rule formation startegies. In addition,
noise produced by seasonal adjustment ltering is prohibitively large
when measured in a variety of dierent ways, prompting us to conclude
that the use of seasonally unadjusted data is preferable to the use of
seasonally adjusted data. Finally, it appears to be in the best inter-
est of empirical economists to wait until some of the data uncertainty
associated with preliminary data has been removed by the revision pro-
cess before formulating adaptive rules based on an empirical analysis of
macroeconomic data.
It is our view that many of the prescriptions and diagnoses which
we give in this paper are useful not only within the context of monetary
23
policy rule construction, but also within the context of the application of
real-time data to macroeconomics in general. Indeed, we believe that the
importance of using real-time data has not yet been fully recognized in
mainstream economics, and many empirical techniques rely too heavily
on the presumption that economic data are nal and readily available.
The construction of monetary policy rules is only one example, although
a very important one, of how data and model uncertainty become rele-
vant when we attempt to gather together empirical ndings which are
representative of the real-time ow of events in the economy.
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Table 2a: Real-Time Dataset Summary Statistics
Seasonally Adjusted Industrial Production: 1979:2-1996:5
FIXED WIDTH REVISIONS INCREASING WIDTH REVISIONS
Mean Var- Skew- Kurt- Mean Var- Skew- Kurt-
iance ness osis iance ness osis
i=1 0.076 0.398 13.79 19.59 0.076 0.398 13.79 19.59
i=2 0.096 0.400 13.94 19.87 0.171

0.848 9.776 9.846
i=3 0.023 0.410 14.08 20.04 0.226

0.899 9.790 9.837
i=4 0.015

0.475 14.11 20.21 0.221

0.887 9.814 9.927
i=5 0.014

0.409 14.11 20.93 0.218

0.806 9.800 9.620
i=6 0.014

0.469 14.10 20.69 0.224

0.781 9.763 9.147
i=7 0.014

0.486 14.04 20.51 0.231

0.829 9.795 9.686
i=8 0.015

0.442 14.06 20.98 0.226

0.804 9.784 9.446
i=9 0.015

0.407 14.07 20.12 0.232

0.820 9.791 9.606
i=10 0.015

0.429 14.08 20.33 0.227

0.827 9.786 9.543
i=11 0.005 0.480 14.10 20.68 0.225

0.801 9.788 9.537
i=12 0.014

0.426 14.11 20.20 0.225

0.803 9.811 9.894
i=18 0.015

0.434 13.99 19.95 0.230

0.840 9.770 9.448
i=24 0.014 0.444 13.65 19.37 0.220

0.821 9.718 9.853
Seasonally Unadjusted Industrial Production: 1979:2-1996:5
FIXED WIDTH REVISIONS INCREASING WIDTH REVISIONS
Mean Var- Skew- Kurt- Mean Var- Skew- Kurt-
iance ness osis iance ness osis
i=1 -0.191

4.444 -0.145 3.454 -0.191

4.044 -0.145 3.454
i=2 -0.058

0.110 1.347 28.31 -0.207

4.126 -0.142 3.404
i=3 -0.016 0.078 -6.073 81.67 -0.216

4.390 -0.413 4.213
i=4 -0.025 0.357 -8.080 107.2 -0.146 4.247 -0.075 3.547
i=5 0.046

0.288 13.07 180.4 -0.184

4.060 -0.154 3.435
i=6 0.007 0.017 12.33 169.2 -0.177

4.077 -0.153 3.417
i=7 0.014

0.032 13.59 191.5 -0.176

4.087 -0.150 3.406
i=8 0.015

0.031 12.10 179.0 -0.180

4.075 -0.150 3.421
i=9 0.012

0.022 13.08 180.3 -0.179

4.071 -0.154 3.419
i=10 0.013

0.026 12.43 167.4 -0.182

4.078 -0.161 3.435
i=11 0.009 0.018 12.75 174.5 -0.183

4.093 -0.167 3.454
i=12 0.009 0.026 11.54 156.7 -0.181

4.064 -0.151 3.437
i=18 <0.001 0.001 -12.56 99.04 -0.205

4.121 -0.163 3.408
i=24 -0.001 0.043 -13.73 194.0 -0.220

4.222 -0.232 3.596
Seasonally Adjusted Consumer Price Index: 1987:2-1996:5
FIXED WIDTH REVISIONS INCREASING WIDTH REVISIONS
Mean Var- Skew- Kurt- Mean Var- Skew- Kurt-
iance ness osis iance ness osis
i=1 -0.003

<0.001 -3.880 26.33 -0.003

<0.000 -3.880 26.33
i=2 -0.003

<0.001 -2.972 21.18 -0.007

0.001 -2.391 11.36
i=3 -0.004

<0.001 -3.576 21.64 -0.006

0.001 -2.505 12.43
i=4 -0.003

<0.001 -3.839 25.53 -0.004

<0.000 -3.274 18.60
i=5 -0.001

<0.001 -7.105 52.06 -0.003

0.001 -1.694 11.96
i=6 <0.001 <0.001 -0.551 18.39 -0.003

0.001 -1.814 12.86
i=7 -0.001 <0.001 -0.743 22.04 <0.000 0.001 0.439 15.16
i=8 0.003

<0.001 3.904 30.62 -0.001 0.001 -0.169 16.37
i=9 0.002

<0.001 4.502 38.60 <0.000 0.001 0.325 16.32
i=10 0.003

<0.001 4.560 36.19 -0.002 0.001 -0.410 13.74
i=11 0.001 0.001 0.241 23.66 -0.004

0.001 -1.577 14.09
i=12 -0.001 0.001 -1.865 25.46 -0.006

0.001 -3.363 16.47
i=18 -0.002

<0.001 -3.018 21.14 -0.006

0.001 -2.837 13.68
i=24 <0.001 <0.001 -5.155 22.52 -0.003

<0.000 -3.880 26.33
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Notes to Table 2a:

denotes a mean value that is signicantly dif-
ferent from zero based on a 95% condence interval constructed us-
ing a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent variance esti-
mator. Fixed width revisions are constructed as ln(X
t+i 1
(t   2))  
ln(X
t+i 2
(t   2)) and increasing width revisions are constructed as
ln(X
t+i 1
(t   2))   ln(X
t 1
(t   2)), where X is either IP or CPI. In
these denitions, the subscript refers to the release date of the data,
while the bracketed index denotes the the date to which the release per-
tains (see Table 1). For example, the "i 2" rows in the table correspond
to ln(X
t+1
(t   2))   ln(X
t
(t  2)) for the xed width revisions. In this
case, the second release for the period t is subtracted from the third
release for period t. For increasing width revisions, the "i = 2" rows
correspond to ln(X
t+1
(t  2))  ln(X
t 1
(t  2)), so that the rst release
(or rst available data) is subtracted from the third release for the pe-
riod t  2. The sample period for which we present summary statistics
is determined by our real-time simulation experiments. The period re-
ported on for IP is longer than for CPI because additional IP data were
needed in order to estimate trend lines for use in output gap construc-
tion. Results for our larger sample periods (from 1950 for IP and 1978
for CPI) are qualitatively similar, and are available upon request from
the authors. The end period of the data is 1996:5, corresponding to the
last interest rate observation used in our subsequent ex-ante analysis.
This end date was used (as opposed to the actual end of our sample -
1998:3) in order to facillitate an ex-ante versus ex-post comparison of
policy rule performance (see discussion in Section 5).
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Table 2b: Vintages of the Output Gap and Ination,
Summary Statistics
Seasonally Adjusted Output Gap: 1990:2-1996:3
FIXED WIDTH REVISIONS INCREASING WIDTH REVISIONS
Mean Var- Skew- Kurt- Mean Var- Skew- Kurt-
iance ness osis iance ness osis
i=1 -8.675

540.7 -0.830 5.743 -8.675

540.7 -0.830 5.743
i=2 -5.631

384.2 -1.109 9.198 -14.30

1087 -0.526 4.543
i=3 -4.011

187.0 -3.779 33.96 -18.31

1267 -0.646 4.452
i=4 -0.192 122.2 -7.887 86.90 -18.50

1398 -0.920 5.057
i=5 -0.389 139.0 -8.119 87.28 -18.89

1625 -1.140 5.991
i=6 -0.873 87.56 -9.754 104.1 -19.77

1783 -1.234 5.917
i=7 0.097 34.03 -3.703 58.49 -19.67

1834 -1.193 5.645
i=8 0.162 54.95 -5.178 61.66 -19.51

1946 -1.135 5.243
i=9 0.070 75.62 2.289 52.15 -19.44 2087 -1.002 4.802
i=10 -0.323 97.71 -0.336 35.42 -19.76 2169 -0.899 4.429
i=11 0.042 211.7 3.069 56.22 -19.72

2347 -0.763 4.058
i=12 -1.281 151.9 -8.149 79.83 -21.00

2440 -0.670 3.762
i=18 -0.556 28.02 -1.987 27.74 -25.89

2632 -0.461 3.379
i=24 -2.474 527.2 -7.995 76.15 -33.06 3513 -0.852 4.130
Seasonally Unadjusted Output Gap: 1990:2-1996:3
FIXED WIDTH REVISIONS INCREASING WIDTH REVISIONS
Mean Var- Skew- Kurt- Mean Var- Skew- Kurt-
iance ness osis iance ness osis
i=1 -7.375

480.5 0.630 6.688 -7.375

480.5 0.630 6.688
i=2 -3.129 587.1 3.501 27.13 -10.50

1095 1.293 8.607
i=3 -2.018 153.0 1.331 9.921 -12.52

1165 1.103 7.251
i=4 -4.046

3228 -10.51 114.8 -16.56

4571 -6.713 65.89
i=5 6.848 3534 10.37 112.0 -9.721

1243 1.071 6.916
i=6 1.187 132.8 9.861 103.5 -8.534

1313 1.006 6.365
i=7 1.960 317.7 9.972 105.1 -6.574 1639 1.477 8.046
i=8 1.914 301.9 10.245 109.7 -4.660 1845 1.512 7.523
i=9 0.416 276.6 5.994 76.21 -4.245 2054 1.407 6.727
i=10 0.887 286.6 8.896 97.76 -3.358 2322 1.434 6.375
i=11 -0.123 328.4 2.660 56.88 -3.481 2729 0.974 5.800
i=12 0.503 337.4 7.622 84.59 -2.978 3125 1.118 5.899
i=18 -1.255 157.7 -10.62 116.0 -9.481 4296 0.444 4.910
i=24 -1.750 204.6 -8.509 77.65 -16.22 4938 0.402 4.271
Seasonally Adjusted Ination: 1990:2-1996:3
FIXED WIDTH REVISIONS INCREASING WIDTH REVISIONS
Mean Var- Skew- Kurt- Mean Var- Skew- Kurt-
iance ness osis iance ness osis
i=1 -0.086 1.326 -2.231 31.21 -0.086 1.326 -2.231 31.21
i=2 -0.098 1.460 -2.551 30.02 -0.184 2.769 -1.552 15.14
i=3 -0.455

3.049 -3.585 14.20 -0.639

5.650 -1.563 7.050
i=4 -0.266

1.913 -5.038 27.37 -0.906

7.220 -1.374 5.282
i=5 0.110 1.575 3.104 36.79 -0.795

8.997 -0.682 5.055
i=6 -0.110 3.284 -1.314 17.58 -0.906

12.10 -0.374 3.949
i=7 -0.105 3.101 -1.505 19.79 -1.011

15.01 -0.208 3.319
i=8 0.196 5.539 1.709 27.36 -0.815 20.95 0.194 3.930
i=9 0.124 3.171 3.810 36.92 -0.692 24.32 0.336 3.670
i=10 0.265 4.620 3.742 27.87 -0.427 29.31 0.429 3.317
i=11 0.297 13.741 3.280 32.00 -0.130 43.31 0.795 4.867
i=12 0.026 8.354 -1.008 23.69 -0.104 51.67 0.545 4.025
i=18 0.102 1.279 10.82 119.0 -0.432 64.37 0.189 3.428
i=24 -0.015 0.029 -10.82 119.0 -0.262 64.00 0.148 3.442
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Notes to Table 2b: See notes to Table 2a. Fixed width revisions are
constructed as (
^
X
t+i 1
(t 2) 
^
X
t+i 2
(t 2))100 and increasing width
revisions are constructed as (
^
X
t+i 1
(t   2) 
^
X
t 1
(t   2))  100, where
^
X is either the output gap or ination. The sample period reported cor-
responds to the period used in the 50 month policy simulation reported
on in subsequent tables.
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Figure 1: Effective Federal Funds Rate and Simulated Ex-Ante Policy Decisions: 1992:04 to 1996:05.
Notes: See Section 4 for a description of the rules. Results are reported for the Fixed Window case and for the 50 month policy simulation
period. Rules 2 to 4 are modified real-time versions of a simple ex-ante monetary policy rule which we refer to as Taylor's Rule (Rule 1).
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Figure 2: Effective Federal Funds Rate and Simulated Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Policy Decisions: 1992:04 to 1996:05.
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Notes: See notes to Figure 1. Simulated ex-post federal funds rate values are based on ex-post finalized data.
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